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I. IN T R O D U C T IO N
It is scarcely surprising that issues o f commercial policy hovered high on 
the agenda o f public controversy as Latin American countries m oved 
through the first decades o f Independence. A num ber o f  factors may 
account for this prom inence. For one thing, this was a field o f discussion 
on which those in policy-making circles had long experience. Trade 
policy had, after all, been at the forefront o f concern during much o f  the 
last half-century o f colonial rule in Spanish America, for besides the com ­
mercial impact o f eighteenth-century Bourbon reforms, the N apoleonic 
interlude in Spain had produced changes in trade flows that provoked 
further com m entary as the nineteenth  century opened. Even in the case 
o f Brazil, policy debates during the Pombaline era had revolved around 
commercial issues,1 while the gaining o f independence in Spanish A m er­
ica and the removal o f the Portuguese court to  Rio de Janeiro (with the 
afterm ath o f this transposition) both  seemed to open up new possibil­
ities for organizing external econom ic connections.” Just how  this reor­
ganization would look, though, became one o f the m ost unsettled issues 
o f the new republics, and, to  a lesser extent, o f the em pire which sprang 
up, like a m ushroom , in Brazil.
The intellectual environm ent, as shaped by expert opinion, was likewise 
supportive o f  the policy com m unity’s preoccupation with trade. In 
Spain, the mercantilistic views o f such reform ers as Campillo y Cossio 
and W ard favored som e degree o f trade liberalization and foresaw great 
benefits accruing for bo th  public and private purposes from a foreign
1 For Spanish America, see Walker (1979); Ham nett (1971) and Brading (1971) for 
insight into the sorts o f issues involved. For Brazil, Maxwell (1973), H.E.S. Fisher 
(l97l), and Maxwell (1968).
2 The opening o f the Brazilian market to British exporters is covered in the authori­
tative book of Manchester (1933).
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trade multiplier effect. A sort o f  trade-centered developm ent theory, 
w ith a remarkably refined understanding o f the relation between trade 
and production, had, in fact, come to  be generally accepted, though not 
fully im plem ented, in Spanish official circles in the latter half o f the 1700s. 
Even the new countercurrents in econom ic doctrine, which also came to 
be known and discussed in Latin America,3 elevated foreign commerce 
to a key position in explanations o f  progress towards opulence. Such was 
the case am ongst the physiocrats, for example, and it was even m ore 
strongly stressed in the strain o f  econom ic liberalism that ran through 
Petty, Hum e, Stewart, and, o f course, Smith and Ricardo. Happy the na­
tion, the preaching went, that welcomed goods and traders from afar. 
N ew  Latin American governm ents were, to  be sure, by no means the only 
ones to wrangle over trade policy. In Britain, the lucrative trade with 
India had been opened to com peting merchants only in 1813; that with 
China would be liberalized in the 1830s. Custom s duties were reform ed 
and substantially reduced under H uskisson in the 1820s, w ith a second 
wave o f reductions com ing under Peel in the 1840s. The same decade 
brought repeal o f  the Corn Laws, after long agitation for their abolition, 
and the penultim ate legislation for pu tting  an end to  the navigation acts 
after a long series o f  liberalizations that began in 1824. These were finally 
laid to  rest in 1854. Meanwhile, France, having instituted under N apoleon 
the Continental System as a means o f  contesting the British for com m er­
cial supremacy, m oved in a generally protectionist direction until the 
1850s. Germany, for its part, was caught up from 1828 to 1834 in the for­
m ation o f the Zollverein, the culmination o f which was a tariff system that 
was less restrictive and less complicated than was usual in Europe at that 
time. Elsewhere in Europe commercial policy was also under discussion, 
but perhaps less visible to Latin Americans than in the case o f the fore- 
going.
For Latin Americans travelling northw ard, the view was no t different. 
A lexander H am ilton’s Report on Manufactures ([1791] 1913) engendered a 
running controversy after its presentation at the end o f 1791, becoming 
the bible for the first American tariff campaigns that began a vigorous 
effort to change national policy at the close o f the N apoleonic Wars. In 
short, th roughout the N orth  Atlantic “reference g roup” o f nations to 
which Latin Americans related, trade policy was very much in the lim e­
light, and the apparent correlation between participation in trade and
3 A glimpse o f the Latin American reflection o f these theoretical and ideological 
developments is found in Gondra et al. (1945).
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national wealth created a kind o f dem onstration effect in public policy. 
Had anyone in em ancipated colonies doubted the im portance o f trade 
am ongst nations and the policies shaping it, he would have been swim­
ming against the prevailing current o f  international opinion in respect o f 
w hat m atters should rightly be reckoned serious.
Even technology appeared to underscore the im portance o f  trade. The 
first half o f  the nineteenth  century brought to  Europe, be it recalled, a 
major extension o f canal construction, the onset o f railway building, sig­
nificant im provem ents in sailing vessels, and the beginning o f  steam 
navigation. M oreover, the im port requirem ents o f the industrial revolu­
tion then abuilding were already becom ing evident, as in the need for 
hides for industrial belting, while it was equally plain that the new p ro ­
duction technologies would eventually turn out an even larger export­
able surplus. Indeed, in reflection o f  these tw in concom itants o f indus­
trialization, as well as o f declining shipping costs, population grow th, and 
im proving incomes, global com merce was unmistakably on the rise — 
and with it the influence o f  economic interests concerned w ith com m er­
cial policy. Exporters, the manufacturers w hose products they handled, 
and the financiers w ho dealt in overseas traffic were beginning to  cast a 
covetous eye on the markets supposedly held largely beyond their reach 
by Iberian imperial policies and were ready to  pounce on the new com ­
mercial opportunities o f the region once the ramparts o f  em pire had 
been dism antled. In a sense, a “pent-up  supply” was just waiting to  match 
w hat was believed to  be a pent-up dem and. (That in many instances avi­
dity led these interests to leap before they looked, so that they ended in 
commercial failure, is another m atter.)
From the standpoint o f Latin Americans, there was one final circum­
stance that made commercial policy so com pelling a topic: namely, the 
intim ate association between trade flows (the chief “grow th industry” of 
that day) and the prevailing structure o f privilege. Agriculture, the cus­
tomary base o f American social preferm ent and econom ic status, was not 
as static in production and ownership as has som etim es been suggested, 
notw ithstanding the dom inance o f  the latifundia-minifundia com plex 
and the sluggish pace o f  change in local markets o ther than those o f  the 
mining zones. W ealth was certainly to  be had from  farming or ranching 
for Latin American markets, but generally it was garnered from  the 
extent o f operation (and from  adapting the ou tpu t mix to  slowly grow ­
ing urban m arkets) rather than from  significant innovation.4 For those
4 For a particularly fine account o f provincial agriculture see Van Young (1981).
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holdings situated favorably in relation to exterior transport routes and in 
ecological conditions that provided suitable production options, how ev­
er, the opportunity  costs o f  producing for export were generally quite 
low and the attraction o f  overseas sales correspondingly high. Mining, 
that other mainstay o f  the colonial economy, was even m ore dependent 
for its prosperity on sales abroad.
M anufacturing had come, during the colonial era, to  be far m ore w ide­
spread than is som etim es believed by those who m isinterpret the regula­
tory regime im posed by the Crown, but scarcely anywhere in the region 
could it have been considered a really prom ising route to riches. M ean­
while, the institutional structure o f banking and finance, by the time 
independence was achieved, was a striking case o f  arrested developm ent. 
This left commerce, then, and especially trade w ith overseas suppliers 
and customers, as the area o f  econom ic opportunity  that beckoned m ost 
strongly to  those concerned either to gain in material standing o r to con­
serve the privileged standing which had been theirs under the conces­
sionary system o f  regulated commerce. W hatever else they may have 
represented, the argum ents about commercial policy rested, therefore, 
on an objective basis o f  factional struggles over profit and status.
II. V ICISSITUDES OF POLICY
In the wake o f  independence, all kinds o f  conflicts welled up to disturb 
the policy process for the next three decades or so. Since for three 
hundred years the state had been the center o f  social gravity, it was un ­
avoidable that the arena o f  public policy should become a battlefield on 
which new realignments o f  class, regional, ideological, and sectorial dif­
ferences would be w orked out. T hose w ho favored decentralization vied 
with p roponents o f centralism, conservatives contended w ith liberals, 
and regional interests som etim es w ent so far as to  shatter the new “na­
tional” unity. Political factions, built on personal and familial loyalties, 
and political chieftains w ho were scarcely m ore than warlords added to 
the confusion. Behind it all, occasional rumblings o f  class antagonism 
and disputes am ong sectorial interests could be distinguished. In the 
field o f  trade policy, yet another cleavage came into play: to wit, that be­
tween those who w anted to em ploy trade measures as an instrum ent o f 
w hat today we would call industrial policy and those who saw tariffs p ri­
marily as a source o f public revenues. W ith so many cross-currents run­
ning, small w onder it was that any semblance o f  a stable policy consensus
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was generally to  prove chimerical. The story o f  those days has been 
recounted so frequently that we need not pay close attention  to  detail. 
Nevertheless, some examples may be brought up to illustrate the basis 
on which lines were often drawn. For this purpose, the two countries at 
either end o f the crumbled em pire were particularly instructive.
In Mexico, the m ost developed o f the overseas kingdom s, there were 
lingering overtones o f rivalry between the privileged m erchant groups of 
form er days and both  provincial trading firms and newcomers to  the 
mercantile scene. Adding to the policy stew, which often had a regional 
cast to it, were the concerns o f those w ho sought to preserve and 
strengthen the country’s manufacturing base and who, m ore generally, 
favored retention o f the Hispanic heritage o f  governance and social orga­
nization. T he first decades o f republican governm ent embraced, accord­
ingly, sets o f policies with quite divergent aims, but w ith intervals in 
which an assortm ent o f  interventionary means were em ployed to  p ro ­
m ote industrial developm ent.5
U nder the guidance o f such outstanding political leaders as Lucas Ala- 
mán and such entrepreneurs as Estevan de A ntuñano, Mexican conser­
vatives succeeded in the latter half o f the 1830s in halting the liberal fed­
eralism earlier expounded and im plem ented by such figures as Valentin 
G óm ez Farias and José María Luis Mora. Internal duties were reduced or 
eliminated to  free the national m arket o f internal im pedim ents to trade, 
but external duties m oved towards protective levels. A national devel­
opm ent bank, established during an earlier conservative interlude, was 
used to further the cause o f industrialization. In a few instances, state 
governm ents also pu t up funds for the establishm ent o f  new factories. 
O ne m ust not, however, seek overall consistency in policy from  any po lit­
ical group in this troubled period, and in any case the extraordinary 
turnover, usually irregular, in governm ent between 1822 and 1867 and the 
disastrous effects o f the Texas secession and the war with the U nited Sta­
tes all tended to  overwhelm any possibility o f there being stable policies 
producing predictable results.
Further, in Mexico as in m ost o f  the rest o f Latin America in this era, a suc­
cession o f arbitrary and autocratic governm ents installed regimes that 
were neither notably efficient nor im bued with high standards o f probity 
in carrying out the w rit o f law. Thus, any literal reading o f  the historical 
experience on the assum ption that there was much correspondence be-
5 Potash (1959). Also of great usefulness are Cordova (1976) and several other 
volumes in the first and second series o f the valuable Colección de Documentos para 
la Historia del Comercio Exterior de México (Mexico).
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tween legislation and practical reality tends to be an exercise in counter- 
factual historiography.
At the o ther end o f the Hispanic realm, Argentina m oved towards eco­
nom ic liberalism from alm ost the beginning o f  independent existence.6 
The general tariff o f  1822, for example, provided for a relatively m oderate 
level o f duties, with som ew hat m ore protection for a few selected items, 
while the Anglo-Argentine treaty o f three years later reinforced the lib­
eral orientation o f trade policy even though it did not directly deal with 
tariff levels and such like. A lthough rather m ore protection crept into the 
picture through subsequent revisions in the tariff schedule in that decade 
and the next and although the im portation o f selected items was p ro ­
hibited altogether, during the 1840s any policy bias towards a protective 
support for national developm ent — a position advanced by federalists 
m ore than by the Unitarians — receded in the face o f  a num ber of con­
siderations. W hat is m ore, as in Mexico, econom ic policy was frequently 
swam ped by other circumstances: a war with Brazil, a blockade by the 
French, difficulties in managing external finance, a continuing struggle 
between Buenos Aires and the interior provinces that from  tim e to time 
erupted into civil war, and the usual problem s o f im plem enting the 
law.
In Argentina, as in Mexico and elsewhere, the circumstances o f  economic 
geography also played a role in shaping policy outcom es. W hereas 
th roughout much o f  the interior o f Latin America overland transport 
costs were high, so that freight charges som etim es provided a measure o f 
protection for inland producers, foreign goods enjoyed a considerable 
advantage in littoral areas and in those few interior regions reachable 
relatively cheaply from the coast. For Argentina, such considerations 
w orked to  favor the interests o f  those endorsing (and benefitting from ) 
liberal trade policies; for Mexico, they lent support to the m ore pro tec­
tionist inclined. In Colom bia and highland Ecuador, econom ic experi­
ence ran m ore along Mexican lines; in Chile and Uruguay, m ore like the 
A rgentine case.
Finally, constraining econom ic liberals (the Unitarians) and those o f  a 
m ore conservative bent (the federalists) in A rgentina was a further factor 
that operated th roughout Latin A m erica: the exigencies o f  a fiscal system 
based heavily on trade taxes. N either a frankly protectionist posture nor a
6 The Argentine may be the Latin American country best covered by scholarly 
inquiry. Among the works affording a good view o f the economic conditions and 
policies in this period are Bürgin (1946); Ferns (i960); Reber (1979); and Brown 
(1979).
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full-fledged espousal o f free-trade was possible, given this dependence. 
The disordered state o f political life simply underscored this imperative 
by reducing the efficiency o f  the fiscal system while piling additional bur­
dens (for financing social control and civil com bat) on it,particularly after 
a repaym ent record that reduced the possibility o f further recourse to 
foreign loans.
In between Mexico and Argentina, the picture was similarly mixed, save, 
perhaps, for the 1810-1844 period in which Brazilian commercial policy 
tended  to be fairly liberal, particularly in respect o f  trade with G reat Brit­
ain (M anchester 1933). Peru, for instance, had started on its national p ro j­
ect with an im petus from Bolivar’s som ew hat eccentric and autocratic 
vision o f liberalism.7 The conventional historical in terpretation o f  the 
subsequent decades is that the country was marked by econom ic disinte­
gration and a preoccupation with the political rivalries o f caudillos, both  
o f which are undeniable. M ore disputable, however, is the assertion that 
econom ic liberalism reigned and that the state w ithdrew, in reaction to 
colonial interventionism , to  a passive role, an interpretation found even 
in such impressive works as Basadre’s (1968). G ranting that the shifting 
political currents underm ined policy coherence, one can nevertheless 
distinguish a decidedly interventionist bent in the policy style to m id­
century and even beyond, in spite o f liberalization measures introduced 
in the 1830s and the 1840 reform o f the Commercial Code. Even this lat­
ter, the apogee o f early liberalism, was not w ithout a nod or two in the 
direction o f  protection, and, in any case, the 1849 changes in tariffs 
brought a dramatic end to this interlude.
O ff and on, protective tariffs (o rprotection-inspired  differences in duties 
on im ports o f raw materials and finished goods), national preference in 
buying, waivers o f  duties on im ported industrial inputs, subsidies, prizes, 
m onopoly concessions, and even public enterprises were all em ployed, 
albeit none too systematically, to  further the industrialization o f the 
country.8 In 1840, for example, the very year the liberal Commercial Code 
was enacted, the Peruvian governm ent took  a minority shareholding 
in terest in W heelw right’s new steam ship m onopoly for coastal trade 
while o ther restricted m onopoly grants were em ployed to  encourage 
industrial establishm ents in 1841,1842,1845,1846,1847,1848, and 1849. 
W hen the guano boom  g o t underway in the 1840s, this industry, too, was 
operated on governm ent account by an assortm ent o f  concessionaires.
7 An interesting on-the-spot appraisal o f the liberator is reported in Clayton (Ms.
1982).
8 Saulniers (1981) provides a masterful study of this period.
386 William P. Glade
Economic nationalism surfaced in early Colombia as well, for from 1821 
into the 1840s, tariffs were m oderately protective while, as noted  above, 
the extra costs o f reaching, over a very poorly developed transport sys­
tem, the interior markets o f that m ountainous land afforded local m anu­
facturers an additional safeguard against com peting im ports. Loans from 
public funds were likewise resorted to  in an effort to  spur industrial 
developm ent, although the civil wars that afflicted the new state in 1828- 
1831,1839-1842, and 1851-1854 hardly established a climate conducive to a 
positive response to  the policy inducem ents o f that day. Still o ther policy 
expedients were tried as well before the orientation o f  policy makers 
shifted, in the 1840s, in a m ore liberal direction. (The establishm ent of 
regular shipping services on the Magdalena at mid-century reduced the 
factor o f  geographical protection in approxim ately the same period .)1' 
W hat the Columbian case highlights, as Safford has so convincingly indi­
cated, is the im portance, at least at certain times, o f regional divergence in 
policy preferences and the danger o f simplistic interpretations o f the 
basis o f the liberal/conservative division (i.e., urban vs. rural, middle class 
vs. landed aristocracy, etc.). Economic interests were not easily sorted out 
into neat policy categories during the economic, political, and ideological 
turbulence o f the three decades up to ca. 1850, nor, for that matter, was 
there always a sharp differentiation between foreigners and nationals in 
the allocation o f econom ic roles. Here and there, national entrepreneurs 
(even o f the upper class) labored alongside those who imm igrated to 
set up the new businesses o f  a dawning industrial age. In short, un tan­
gling the strands o f commercial policy in the decades following indepen­
dence is a task that m ust frankly accept the existence o f  contradictions, 
inconsistencies, and broad areas o f ambiguity, to  say nothing o f consider­
able variation by product and region in the actual econom ic experience 
o f  the age.
III. COM M ERCIAL DEVELOPM ENTS TO  1850
Varied as was the Latin American policy scene between ca. 1820 and ca. 
1850, the actual unfolding o f external com merce was no less so. Indeed, 
since in this instance the variation was pronounced even at the subna­
tional regional level and by sector and industry, the picture presented is, if
9 The classic study is, o f course, Ospina Vásquez (195 5), but m ost instructive, too, is 
Safford (1977).
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anything, m ore com plex than that found in the area o f policy. Some 
zones became quickly caught up in the rhythm s o f the em ergent world 
economy; others were absolutely untouched. So diverse were regional 
experiences, in fact, that the notion o f an area-wide “average” or “norm ” is 
meaningless for this period. O ne o f  the few generalizations that can be 
ventured, perhaps, is that while some new machinery was im ported into 
Latin America during this period, the major impact by far o f  foreign trade 
seems to have been m ore on the consum ption patterns o f a com parative­
ly small segm ent o f the region’s population than on the technology and 
organization o f  production. Apart from this, given the differences that 
characterized the region in this period, it w ould be as unfeasible to try to 
portray the whole o f  Latin American export experience as it was to essay 
a com prehensive review o f policies. Again, a few observations m ust suf­
fice to indicate the range o f variation.
In Peru, for example, where the degree o f trade dislocation easily 
matched the country’s political disorder and where a large external debt 
was quickly run up and into default, the general condition o f  national 
exports was unedifying up to  the time that guano became im portant. 
True, from the southern highlands o f that country there came a m oun t­
ing stream o f wool exports, chiefly alpaca and llama (Bonilla 1974b). 
Ranging between 349 lbs. and 2,224 lbs. in the 1826-30 period, the annual 
volum e exported rose to 1.4 million lbs. in 1843 and was over 1.2 million 
lbs. every year from 1848 on. Elsewhere, however, the record was largely 
barren in respect o f  material progress, the m ining industry remaining 
prostrate from the decline that set in around 1803-11 (Fisher 1977). 
Colombia fared no better. A short-lived investm ent boom let based on 
the extravagant expectations British capitalists had for reviving silver 
m ining was quickly sniffed out, and the fact that the foreign debt w ent so 
quickly into default was an additional discouragem ent. The trade records 
from the period leave much to be desired, partly because there, as well as 
elsewhere, the taxes levied on exports and the laxity o f public adm inis­
tration m eant that there were strong incentives to avoid accurate repo rt­
ing. But so far as is know n, there appears to have been a virtual stagnation 
in exports as a whole (N ieto  A rteta 1942) though within this dismal pic­
ture there were exceptions. Hides and coffee exports, both  began to  rise, 
as they did, along w ith cacao, from neighboring Venezuela.
Mexico had enjoyed a remarkable resurgence o f  m ining in the late colo­
nial era, but despite the high hopes this engendered for the post-inde- 
pendence period in the m inds o f  both  foreign investors and Mexican 
nationals, the story to  mid-century was one o f d isappointm ent and dis-
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couragem ent punctuated only infrequently by success — particularly 
before the 1840s (Cassidy 1974). O n the agricultural side the picture was 
hardly impressive. (It should be kept in mind, though, that Mexico was, 
in Latin America, uniquely ham pered by the loss o f  substantial portions 
o f  its national territory during the period under review.)
Com pared with m ost o f  Latin America, Brazil perform ed marginally bet­
ter in its foreign trade, thanks to the gradual increase in sugar exports and 
to  a rather m ore rapid rise in coffee exports. It was in the south, though, 
that the outlines o f  a new economic era began to  be visible. The rem ark­
able increase o f  shipping out o f Chilean ports, for instance, reflected a 
rise in exports o f  silver, followed by a growing exportation made up of 
wheat, copper, nitrate, and guano. As elsewhere there had been a spree o f 
speculative foreign investm ents in the mid-1820s that failed alm ost as 
quickly as they had started up, but these were soon followed by undertak­
ings o f greater longevity and productivity. In Argentina the situation 
developed even m ore promisingly. H ides and wool were shipped to 
m eet the grow ing consum ption in both  the British and U.S. markets, and 
o ther animal products — horse hair, horns, lard and tallow, and even 
bones — likewise m oved ou t in growing volume. So, o f course, did salted 
beef, given dem ographic grow th, urbanization, and rising incomes in 
W estern Europe.
Much remains to be pieced together for a detailed assessm ent o f Latin 
America’s trade and trade policy in the 1820-1850 period. W hat does 
seem clear already is that the determ ining factors in trade flows were, 
overridingly, the strength and configuration o f dem and in Europe (and, 
in lesser measure, the U nited States) on the one hand and the natural 
resource endow m ents o f the different Latin American regions on the 
other. The land factor was much m ore determ inative than were the other 
factors o f production in defining the relatively lim ited range o f  produc­
tion options available to the various exporting regions. The commercial 
policies, as such, o f  the Latin American countries appear to  have m attered 
very little. Indeed, the chief im pact o f the policy environm ent on trade 
flows in any sense was perhaps a negative one, in the area o f m inerals: the 
general disarray in such countries as Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia 
contributed to  the frustration o f efforts to  revamp the m ining sector and 
p u t it on a sounder footing for the export market. Yet even this impact is 
questionable: the underlying problem s in these countries were so intrac­
table that there may not have been any policies available to the leaders o f 
these nations that would have produced the consensus and support on 
which m ore stable regimes m ight have been erected.
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IV. TH E SIG N IFIC A N C E OF COM M ERCIAL POLICY
It is hard to  escape the conclusion that so far as concerns the secular eco­
nomic expansion and developm ent o f Latin America, both  liberal and 
conservative approaches to commercial policy were alm ost equally 
incom plete and unefficacious, especially if we assess these policies in the 
light o f m odern grow th theory, which places the focus on technological 
and organizational change as the source o f  much increased productivity. 
Further, easy as it is to understand why so much attention should have 
been devoted to trade policy in the climate o f opinion that prevailed in 
those days, there is an im portant sense in which the em phasis was quite 
misplaced.True, overseas markets were growing, as were dom estic m ar­
kets (albeit much m ore gradually), though neither grew at the pace that 
occurred later in the century. But while econom ic theory has made much 
o f the w idening o f the m arket as a critical variable, this was, up to m id­
century, much m ore relevant to the vent-for-surplus versions o f trade 
theory developed by Innes, Caves, and others than it was in other 
respects. The economic expansion that occurred in scattered parts o f 
Latin America was, w ith a few notable exceptions, mainly ag ro wth along 
the extensive margin (i.e., the kind o f grow th that came from adding 
m ore but essentially unchanged factors to the production process) rather 
than agrow th  along the intensive margin that would have involved m ore 
change in production functions and greater change in the com position o f 
output. Such, for instance, was the case even in the Argentine where the 
growing engagem ent with export markets activated latent resources on a 
significant scale.There were, to  be sure, som e changes in ou tpu t as well as 
som e changes in the com position or mix o f inputs, but these appear, on 
the whole, to have been som ew hat isolated, sporadic, and discontinuous 
— not, in any case, the kind o f pervasive and continuing changes that 
com posed the grow th process in m ore dynamic situations. Further, as 
experience later in the century was to  reveal m ore sharply, there was even 
a tendency for innovation, w hen it occurred (virtually always by borrow ­
ing rather than by origination), to  take on an enclave character.
For all their intensity and longevity, the quarrels over trade liberalization 
and protectionism  thus verged on the irrelevant from the standpoint o f 
their bearing on the foundations o f  regional econom ic grow th. N o one, 
be it rem em bered, favored isolating the new national economies from 
the world economy by encapsulating them  in a protected  autarchy. And 
both  liberals and conservatives, if for the m om ent we may simplify by dis­
tinguishing only two camps, were nationalist in that they consciously
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sought to consolidate and build up the econom ic base o f the new 
nations. It was, rather, the form o f the articulation o f the Latin American 
economies into the global system on which liberals and conservatives 
parted company, while it was the context o f  this articulation that led to 
the notable disparity between expectation and perform ance.
In retrospect, it is plain that those inclined to  econom ic liberalism 
expected far too much o f  free trade. G iven the institutional strictures 
under which the Latin American economies had labored for three centu­
ries, the dislocations produced by a rapid opening up o f  formerly shel­
tered economies to  foreign com petition undoubtedly benefitted the few 
relatively affluent consum ers o f im ported products much m ore than they 
helped the w orking population shift into m ore rem unerative em ploy­
m ent or entrepreneurs to  come forth to  m eet the challenges o f the day. 
However m oderated the im pact o f this opening may have been by high 
transport and o ther m arketing costs, there is evidence that the new 
manufacturing firms that were established found little economic nurture 
in their environm ent and that a sizable num ber o f  skilled artisans and 
workers in the proto-factories know n as obrajes simply lost their jobs — in 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Mexico, particularly, but to  som e extent 
elsewhere as well. W hat is notable about these untow ard developm ents, 
which were much m ore a function o f product com petition than o f  price 
com petition, is that trade liberalization could provoke so little construc­
tive response in the organization o f  local production.
T he fact o f the m atter is that internal econom ies o f  scale were not, for 
m ost if no t all industries o f  that age, especially significant; hence the op ti­
mal scale o f  factories was no t as constrained by m arket size as it was later, 
w hen m ore cases o f  decreasing-cost industries entered the picture. 
Behind the not inconsiderable margin o f  protection  provided by eco­
nom ic distance, especially in inland markets and, to som e extent, in west- 
coast markets, there was, in principle, potential m arket “room ” for new 
enterprises to  be set up and operate competitively, even with the som e­
w hat higher start-up costs occasioned by the delivered prices o f im port­
ed machinery and equipm ent and with the relatively costly process o f 
learning-by-doing normally associated with infant industries. For the 
same reason, the requisite o f  a substantial m inim um  size o f investm ent 
for entry into production was probably not the barrier it was later to 
become in a num ber o f  lines though the cost o f capital appears to have 
been much higher than it was in England at the time, or even than it had 
been in Latin America during colonial rule. Thus, we may legitimately 
question if either fragm ented small markets or the problem s o f m obiliz­
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ing financial capital on a substantial scale were major im pedim ents to 
absorbing new production technologies and to  reorganizing dom estic 
m anufacturing -  or, for that matter, to  undertaking the m odernization of 
rural production over much of Latin America.
W hat lay behind the distorted transform ation o f the local structure of 
production was partly the institutional locus o f  liberalization. It was the 
product markets that were, in the main, the chief object o f liberalizing 
policies, no t factor markets. These latter -  p inned as they were so closely 
to the structure o f  social pow er — rem ained encum bered by a variety o f 
rigidities: e.g., by assorted barriers to  emergence o f  a m arket in land, by 
peonage and o ther fetters on the labor market, by severe institutional 
constrictions on the evolving array o f  labor skills (i.e., on the generation 
o f m ore diversified human capital), and by the very rudim entary (and, 
with independence, disrupted) developm ent o f a capital m arket in which 
a pre-capitalistic type o f ecclesiastical and familial financing had long 
served as the centerpiece o f the system .10 T he Latin American setting 
was, above all, characterized by factor markets within and am ongst 
which the circulation o f  inform ation, especially technological inform a­
tion, was exceedingly imperfect and through which the entrepreneurial 
orchestration o f the o ther productive factors m oved, at best, by fits and 
starts.
The foregoing circumstances need to be kept in m ind in considering the 
implications o f liberalized trade in product markets and the inform ation 
conveyed by the price signals therein. In essence, transactions in product 
markets are, after all, summarizing transactions; the prices they generate 
constitute a sum m ation o f all the inform ation given in antecedent trans­
actions in factor markets. Since, however, Latin American factor markets 
had no t been loosened up and were still organized so imperfectly, the 
com posite form taken by product prices involved a substantial inform a­
tion loss, im peding the decom position necessary to reveal the relative 
scarcities o f factor com ponents and the factor mix used in production 
processes. U nder these conditions, the insensitivity o f  factor markets in 
their interaction w ith product markets failed to  prom pt and facilitate 
adaptive managerial behavior on the basis o f a flow o f scientific and tech­
nical inform ation, and im ports were therefore o f very lim ited utility as 
guides for m ovem ent towards new patterns o f resource allocation within 
Latin America. In o ther words, owing to the disarticulation o f  the
10 On this latter, which has been somewhat less extensively researched than the 
other two, see Greenow (1983) and Lindley (1983).
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region s factor and product markets, foreign com merce was generally 
much less capable o f  inducing local developm ent than it was, say, in the 
economies o f  the N orth  Atlantic trading com m unity.11 A bsent the orga­
nizational linkages that would transm it price signals and technical infor­
m ation throughout a netw ork o f  factor and product markets, the mar­
shalling o f  resources and assessm ent o f  production alternatives was a far 
stickier and m ore costly process than on the o ther side o f the Atlantic, 
while the external sector tended, in m ore instances than not, to  function 
as an enclave phenom enon and to  snuff out craft production rather than 
hasten its conversion into an industrial sector turning ou t new products 
to com pete with those com ing in from abroad. In several o f  the coun­
tries, entrepreneurs, undaunted by prevailing conditions, did set up new 
factories, but the record suggests that the coordination and synchroniza­
tion o f  production and m arketing processes was fraught w ith excep­
tional difficulty in the early nineteenth-century setting.
Conservatives, paradoxically, suffered from alm ost the same policy m yo­
pia, though in their case it was a question o f  failing to  perceive the full 
range o f  com plem entary policies that would have had to be devised and 
im plem ented if their protective and fomento efforts were to  bear fruit. The 
liberals’ failure to  appreciate the insufficiency o f the trade impulse to 
progress was, am ongst conservatives, marked by a failure to  recognize 
the insufficiency o f  m arket abridgem ent policies as a stimulus to  devel­
opm ent. In both  cases, it was the character o f  local econom ic organization 
that created a hiatus between overseas trade and the incubation o f  devel­
opm ent-furthering processes in Latin America. W hile internal econo­
mies o f  scale were not yet o f  any great im port, external economies of 
scale — the externalities present in the general production  environm ent 
— were o f decisive weight for the possibilities o f  accumulation and struc­
tural transform ation. The contrast o f Latin America with W estern 
Europe, as we shall rem ark shortly, makes this abundantly plain.
This is not to  say that conservatives, any m ore than liberals, took  a sim­
ple-m inded view o f the forces o f production. Far from it. Lucas Alamán, 
for example, saw credit provision and other supportive actions, along 
w ith protective duties, as part o f a policy package for instigating material 
progress. In Colombia, conservatives were notably active in advocating 
technical education and training in the practical arts, and bo th  conserva­
tives and liberals sent their sons abroad for first-hand exposure to the 
new scientific and technological developm ents in Europe, and to the
11 This latter is the role stressed, for example, in Youngson (1959).
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U nited States for the practical applications thereof. But as Safford has 
shown, such efforts to transplant the industrial im petus to Latin America 
were alm ost totally futile (Safford 1976). The gaps in the institutional 
matrix o f econom ic enterprise were simply too great to  be bridged, in the 
short run, by either trade or makeshift policy measures.
For this com plex institutional deficit, monofactorial explanations seem 
patently inadequate, be they psycho-social (e.g., the lack o f a Protestant 
ethic), class-based (e.g., the political supremacy o f a latifundiary elite), or 
couched in term s o f a policy failure o f  one sort or another (e.g., the lim ita­
tions o f Spanish bullionism). Rather, m ost o f the problem s seem ed to 
inhere in the overall inhospitable character o f the social organization 
with which Latin America confronted the industrial capitalism o f the 
n ineteenth  century. This, in turn, was the product o f  an enorm ously com ­
plicated set o f historical experiences which, w orking through culture and 
geography, differentiated the Latin American econom ic milieu sharply 
from that o f Europe and Europe’s N orth  Atlantic offshoot.
As scholar after scholar has shown, the burst o f productivity that came 
about through the organizational and technological changes o f  the 
industrial revolution was essentially a product o f European culture as a 
whole. It was, in o ther words, the outgrow th o f a long social heritage of 
interaction that p rom oted  the circulation o f technical and scientific ideas, 
fostered the production o f new know ledge through experience and 
research, and facilitated the adaptive assimilation and industrial applica­
tion o f this knowledge to agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and trans­
portation. By means ranging from state-sponsored industrial espionage 
and subsidized scientific and technical inquiry to a very considerable 
am ount o f  bo th  tem porary and perm anent migration, the inform ation 
m arket in Europe was characterized by dim inishing imperfections and, 
correspondingly, by falling inform ation search and transfer costs. The 
m ovem ent o f  people, skills, and ideas w orked to facilitate and accelerate 
technological borrow ing, bo th  intra-industry and inter-industry, while 
enhancing the probability forgenerating new technologies and products. 
Indeed, this restructuring o f  econom ic life seems to have been almost 
continuous from  at least the commercial revolution o f  the M iddle Ages 
that López had described (López 1976) and involved an institutional 
fluidity and cosm opolitanism  that contrasted markedly w ith the level o f 
technique and the organization o f operations through which resources 
were transform ed in m ost o f Latin America.
W hereas, for example, there was in Europe a w idespread deliberate p ro ­
m otion o f science and technology during the 18th and 19th centuries and
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even the Spanish Crown occasionally interested itself in the trends o f  the 
day, in Latin America comparatively little was accom plished.12 In Europe, 
too, where, as noted, the progress o f  technology had, for dozens of 
decades, been accelerated by the extraordinary geographical mobility of 
skilled mechanics and the technically adept, the flow o f  econom ic and 
technical inform ation was further facilitated by the activities o f  m er­
chants. It is the fact that so many individuals, firms, and groups played a 
role that is crucial, for it was these w ho com posed, as it were, the exter­
nalities o f scale that gave Europe such a cumulative advantage in shaping 
the em erging world econom y to its needs. As a m ultitude o f studies have 
shown, even the assimilation o f  borrow ed technology required social 
com petence in recognizing w hat could be transferred directly, determ in­
ing w hat could be transferred w ith m odification, and carrying out such 
adaptations as were needed, and it was social action that was involved in 
restructuring the context o f production operations to  accom modate 
m ore advanced technology. Thus it was that in Europe, historically, the 
migration o f skilled personnel could play a catalytic role in these p ro ­
cesses and that often the technical ferm ent that took place did so in those 
portions o f  the econom y m ost linked with international commerce.
In the Iberian world, by way o f  contrast, the circulation o f  the technologi­
cally adept did not, for the m ost part, even reach from France across the 
Pyrenees, much less to Latin America, and trade flows were alm ost scle­
rotic com pared with w hat was going on in Europe at the time. Partly the 
difficulty was that o f econom ic and cultural distance. Latin America lay 
o ff the beaten track, so to speak, and was bo th  relatively inaccessible and 
unattractive to  those who participated m ost actively in the “heritage o f 
im provem ent.” For centuries, the international migration o f technically 
knowlegeable persons largely by-passed the area except for occasional 
royal expeditions and missions and, later, a handful o f hired foreign tech­
nicians. Put off, for m ost o f the tim e, by imperial policy and the stultifying 
rem oteness o f  the region, they were, w ith independence, deterred by the 
num erous negative externalities that plagued the econom ic life o f the 
new republics. The deficiencies o f internal com m unication were a further 
barrier, lim iting the spread effects o f  the w ork o f the few hardy souls
12 The Bourbon government o f Spain recognized the technological backwardness 
of its overseas dom inions and, as is well-known, sent a number o f technical mis­
sions to attem pt to remedy matters. Most such efforts were unavailing so far as 
concerns the prom otion of technological progress though they were successful in 
gathering information. For useful background apart from the much studied m in­
ing field, see Engstrand (1981).
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who, ignoring opportunity  costs, did venture into the liberated lands. By 
all accounts, then, Latin America acquired little experience in mastering 
the skills associated with technological borrowing, let alone in acquiring 
the engineering and scientific ingenuity and commercial resourcefulness 
required forgenerating new technologies as an indigenous p roduct.This 
was no small part o f the reason that private profit did no t m ore often 
carry over into social accumulation.
Partly, though, the difficulty lay in aspects o f the physical environm ent 
and had to  do with the non-transferability to much o f  Latin America of 
the state-of-the-art technology in agriculture, horticulture, and animal 
husbandry that was the source o f so much o f the pre-industrial and early 
industrial surplus in Europe. In this respect, it is doubtless significant that 
in contrast to  Europe, where agricultural m odernization had led indus­
trial innovation, Latin American agriculture remained relatively static 
after the great advances introduced at the time o f the Conquest. Though 
the early 19th century saw som e agricultural im provem ents in Brazil 
where an enlightened monarchy was generally supportive o f  technologi­
cal updating, there was comparatively little investm ent th roughout the 
region (especially beyond the Southern Cone and Brazil) in agricultural 
research and experim entation to resolve key technological uncertainties 
arising at the nexus o f need and circumstances, notw ithstanding the 
prom inence o f the primary sector as the foundation o f econom ic life. 
Over m ost o f  the region, for example, the production technology o f 
maize, cotton, cacao, coffee, and sugar hardly differed in the year o f  Simón 
Bolivar’s death from  w hat had prevailed in the year o f  his birth. The al­
pacas and llamas being sheared for wool in 1850 were no different from 
those to which the Inca had turned for the royal mantle before Pizarro 
came.
If commercial policy seems to have been, at best, a variable o f  secondary 
im portance in determ ining the econom ic grow th o f early republican 
Latin America, the same was not the case with commerce itself, at least 
over the longer haul. Then and there, as elsewhere, international com ­
merce was to function as a conveyor o f organizational and technical skills, 
and the channel o f transm ission for m arket and technical inform ation. 
From the inflow o f these “invisibles,” which accompanied the traffic in 
merchandise alm ost as by-products, came the basis for eventual econo­
mic reorganization, for slowly, if not always so surely, there were establis­
hed on Latin America’s shores the business firms, services, and practices 
that would in tim e help lay the groundw ork for a m ore substantial eco­
nomic advance. Thanks to  these incipient externalities, the long-run
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gains from trade would vastly exceed its short-run benefits. Reber and 
Brown make this p o in t w ith telling clarity in their excellent studies o f the 
A rgentine, but corroborating evidence comes from o ther locations as 
well.13
T hrough com merce, then, the seeds o f  change were being planted, 
though for a harvest that would come much later in m ost cases and, in 
any event, clearly well beyond the planning horizon o f the republican 
politicos w ho debated commercial policy w ith such fervor. For the time 
being, the practical im portance o f  commercial policy was to occupy poli­
ticians and to  give consuls — and, later, historians — som ething to  write 
about.
13 See, for instance, the beachheads extablished, in spite o f many tribulations, by 
British mercantile houses, as reported in Platt (1972).
